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DUE DILIGENCE: A POST-SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
METHOD OF AVOIDING RULE 10b-5 LIABILITY
The once popular sale of business doctrine provided that when an
owner of a corporation transfers 100% of the stock, the federal securities
laws did not apply to the transaction because the stock was not consid-
ered a "security" within the meaning of the Securities Act.1 Some courts
extended the doctrine to the transfer of a majority of shares because the
transaction still transfers effective control.2 The Supreme Court, in Lan-
dreth Timber Co. v. Landreth and Gould v. Ruefenacht, two related cases
decided in the summer of 1985, 3 held the sale of business doctrine inap-
plicable to the sale of a controlling interest and 100% of a corporation's
stock. As a result, a threat of securities liability now accompanies the
sale of a controlling interest in a corporation's stock.
The Supreme Court reasoned that if a transaction involves stock,4 an
interest that possesses all the usual attributes of a security,5 then there is
1. Comment, A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doctrine, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 974 (1983).
The sale of business doctrine has been the subject of considerable academic commentary. See, e.g.,
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W.
RES. 367 (1967); Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transac-
tional Context-Based Analysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW. 929 (1984); FitzGib-
bon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets,
64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in
Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974); Karjala, Realigning Federal and State
Roles in Securities Regulation Through the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 413; Long,
An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA.
L. REV. 135 (1971); Prentice & Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine: New Relieffrom Securi-
ties Regulation or a New Haven for WelshersZ 44 OHIo ST. L.J.; Seldin, When Stock is Not a Secur-
ity: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAWS. 637 (1982);
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not
a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982); Note, Repudiating the Sale-of-Busi-
ness Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1718 (1983); Comment, A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doc-
trine, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 974 (1983); Comment, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase of
Corporate Stock. An Argument for Exclusion from Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 295 (1980).
2. Comment, A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doctrine, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 974 (1983).
3. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 53 U.S.L.W. 4602 (U.S. May 28, 1985) (sale of 100% of
stock); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 53 U.S.L.W. 4607 (U.S. May 28, 1985) (sale of 50% of stock).
4. The Court warned that it was not deciding whether the coverage of notes or other instru-
ments may be provable by their name and characteristics. Landreth 53 U.S.L.W. at 4605.
5. Common characteristics of a security include dividends, voting rights and appreciation in
value.
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no reason to look to underlying economic realities6 to determine whether
the Securities Acts apply.7 The Court further explained that the Act ap-
plies not only to passive investors, but also to privately negotiated trans-
actions involving the sale of control to "entrepreneurs."8
Although applicability of the Act is now certain, liability in the "sale of
business" scenario is not. The sophisticated entrepreneur still may have
difficulty establishing a violation of the antifraud provisions.9 A sophisti-
cated investor's ability to analyze, evaluate, and understand the potential
investment may, in fact, be his downfall under the judicially imposed
justifiable reliance or "due diligence" requirements.
For example, to establish a violation of rule lOb-5,10 the most utilized
and potentially most devastating antifraud provision," plaintiffs must
pass a judicially created "due diligence" inquiry.' 2 In affirmative misrep-
resentation cases, reliance is an essential element of claimant's rule lOb-5
action. 3 Due diligence requires the plaintiff to show justifiable reliance
6. Landreth, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4604. The "economic realities" test originated in S.E.C. v.
Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
7. The Court, however, warned that it would not apply the Securities Act simply because an
instrument is labeled "stock." But when an instrument's characteristics "bear out the label," it is
covered by the Act. Landreth, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4605.
8. Id. at 4605.
9. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, states that he would hold that:
the antifraud securities acts are inapplicable unless the transaction involves (i) the sale of a
security that is traded in a public market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to
negotiate appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside information
before consummating the transaction.
Landreth, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4607. The majority opinion, however, does not explicitly address these
factors. But see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. Securities and Exchange Commission rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
11. Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor Reasonable?", 72 COLUM L.
REv. 562 (1972).
12. Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DuKE L.J. 753,
754 (1975).
13. Reliance is required in affirmative misrepresentation cases. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256
(5th Cir. 1978). In a failure to disclose case under rule lOb-5, however, positive reliance is not an
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/10
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on the defendant's misrepresentation.14
At least eight circuits recognize due diligence as an element of a plain-
tiffs rule 10b-5 action.' 5 The allocation of proof'6 and the required de-
gree of care' 7 varies, but the purpose is the same. The due diligence
requirement attempts to bar claims when the plaintiff has been careless in
ignoring or relying on material of questionable merit.18
Due diligence is linked to the element of causation.19 It insures a
causal connection between the defendant's misrepresentation or omission
and the claimant's injury.2° Since the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
element of the cause of action. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). This
lack of a reliance requirement could be extended to remove any requirement of justifiable reliance or
due diligence by plaintiff in nondisclosure cases. No court, however, has taken this logical step.
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule lOb-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied
Recovery?. 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 100 (1985).
14. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057-77 (D. Del. 1976); Note, supra note 12 at 754.
15. Sachs, supra note 13, at 100; Wheeler, Plaintifs Duty of Due Care Under Rule lOb-5: An
Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy. 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 561, 574 n.42 (1975).
16. Sachs, supra note 13, at 101, n. 23. See also infra note 23.
17. Five circuits measure the duty of care by a recklessness standard. Friedlander v. Nims, 755
F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (adopting standard set
forth by Fifth Circuit in Dupuy); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983)
("only when plaintiff's conduct rises to culpable level of conduct comparable to that of defendant's
will reliance be unjustifiable"); Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting reck-
lessness standard set forth in Dupuy); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own errors of
judgment"); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.) (incorporating Ernst & Ernst reckless-
ness standard into due diligence inquiry), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977) (following Ernst & Ernst scienter standard and
stating "if contributory fault of plaintiff is to cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be
gross conduct somewhat comparable to that of defendant."). Of these five courts, all but the Seventh
Circuit places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1048. The Second
Circuit modifies the burden on the plaintiff by stating that the plaintiff's duty to show due care only
exists when the defendant places it in issue. Mallis, 615 F.2d at 79.
The Supreme Court refused to clarify plaintiff's standard of care in rule lOb-5 cases by denying
certiorari in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). Justice White, dissenting, stated that the "Court
should take this opportunity to clarify the standard of care expected of plaintiffs in litigation under
Rule lOb-5." Id. at 912.
The Third Circuit requires a rule lOb-5 claimant to adhere to a standard of reasonableness. Sharp
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 194 (3d Cir. 1981).
See generally Sachs, supra note 13, for a thorough discussion of the history of the due diligence
requirement and its possible demise after Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct.
2622 (1985).
18. Sachs, supra note 13, at 100.
19. Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516.
20. Id.
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Hochfelder2 decided that "something more than negligence" is required
in rule 10b-5 actions,22 most courts have adopted a recklessness standard
for the due diligence inquiry.23 The due diligence requirement reflects a
judgment that when the plaintiff's conduct reaches the same level of reck-
lessness, injury is more a function of the plaintiff's own carelessness than
the defendant's misrepresentations or omissions.
In view of the recklessness standard, plaintiff-investors may be allowed
a certain amount of "unreasonableness" in making their investment deci-
sions. The recklessness standard, however, is capable of violation. In
Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc.,24 for example, the Tenth Circuit held that warn-
ings and statements25 contained in a private placement memorandum 26
should be imputed to a sophisticated investor even though he has not
read them.27 The investor, therefore, could not justifiably rely on oral
21. 427 U.S. 185 (1976). See generally Sachs, supra note 13, for a discussion of the effect of
Hochfelder on the due diligence inquiry.
22. See Wheeler, Plaintifj's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to an
Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 561, 583 (1975).
23. Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516 (plaintiff's conduct must at least amount to recklessness and rise
to a comparable level of culpability with that of defendant); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1019
(5th Cir.) (inquiry is whether investor intentionally refused to investigate a known or obvious risk),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 600 F. Supp,
692 (D. Me. 1985) (due diligence will be found on part of plaintiff in securities fraud action if he did
not act recklessly). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
In Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that a claimant's burden
is not to establish due care, but simply to negate the defendant's allegation of plaintiff's recklessness.
Mallis, however, is inconsistent with the Second Circuit's decision in Hirsch v. DuPont, 553 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1977). The Hirsch court pronounced a standard of negligence in determining whether
plaintiff's due diligence burden had been met:
The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own
errors of judgment. Such investors must, if they wish to recover under federal law, investi-
gate the information available to them with the care and prudence expected from people
blessed with full access to information.
Id. at 763. This standard seems to have been implicitly overruled by Mallis.
24. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
25. The Private Placement Memorandum included the following warning: "These securities
involve a high degree of risk. See 'Risk and Special Factors' and 'Who Should Invest.'" Id. at 1517.
Another warning also appeared in the Memorandum: "No person has been authorized to give any
information or to make any representations not contained in this memorandum.., and, if given or
made, such information or representations must not be relied upon." Id. at 1517-18.
26. Id. at 1518. The Private Placement Memorandum was equivalent to a prospectus except
that it had not been reviewed by the S.E.C. Id. at 1514 n.3.
27. Id. at 1518. Generally, there is "no duty to disclose information to one who reasonably
should already be aware of it." Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978).
Therefore, there is no fraud where one fails to disclose information that is "easily enough available
by duly diligent inquiry." Rodman v. Grant Found., 460 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
afid, 602 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/10
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misrepresentations made by sellers. 28 The court found that the investor
acted "recklessly by intentionally closing his eyes" 29 and failing to inves-
tigate contradictions between oral representations and information con-
tained in the memorandum.3 ° The Tenth Circuit, however, has refused
to apply the Zobrist rule to unsophisticated investors.
31
In Zobrist, the Tenth Circuit compiled a list of factors it and other
circuits find relevant in determining whether the investor's reliance is
justifiable:
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial matters;
(2) the existence of long standing business or personal relationships; (3) ac-
cess to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship;
(5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud;
(7) whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite
the transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the
misrepresentations.32
The Zobrist court applied these factors and found that although the
parties had prior business dealings, the plaintiff-investor had no long-
standing relationship that would justify reliance on the seller's represen-
tations without inquiry.33 The seller did not conceal the fraud, but
exposed it with information and warnings contained in the private place-
ment memorandum. 34 Although not explicitly relied on by the court, it
is noteworthy that each investor signed a statement acknowledging the
risks set forth in the memorandum, even though it was undisputed that
they did not read it.35 The investors also signed an "Investment Ques-
tionnaire" indicating that they understood the nature of the investment
and the risks involved.36
These signed statements and the Zobrist factors suggest a method for
shielding the seller of a closely held corporation from liability under rule
28. Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516.
29. Id. at 1518. The contradicting terms used by the Zobrist court should be noted; "reckless"
and "intentional" conduct are two separate and distinct standards.
Moreover, other circuits recognize that an investor cannot close his eyes to a known risk. Team-
sters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1985).
30. Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1519.
31. Wegerev v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 744 F.2d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
Zobrist distinguishable because neither of the plaintiffs were sophisticated investors).
32. Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516.
33. Id. at 1518.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1514.
36. Id.
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lOb-5. The solution, however, is not without its problems. Both the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts provide that an attempt to waive compli-
ance with the federal securities laws is void.37 The general counsel for the
Securities Exchange Commission, in interpreting these provisions, ruled
that the antifraud provisions are violated by the employment of any
hedge or other provision waiving investors' securities claims.38 The First
Circuit, for example, has employed section 29(a) of the Exchange Act of
1934 to void a contractual provision that provided: "I am not relying on
your representations or obligations to make full disclosure."3 9 The court
reasoned that the Securities Act attempts to equalize bargaining power
between the individual and corporation through the antiwaiver provi-
sion.40 This reasoning does not apply, however, when the investor is so-
phisticated and already possesses equal bargaining power, as will often be
the case in "sale of business" cases.
One commentator, Margaret Sachs, suggests that due diligence itself is
inconsistent with section 29(a) of the 1934 Act.41 Sachs argues that sec-
tion 29(a) and due diligence reflect opposing philosophies. She concludes
that Congress' enactment of section 29(a) indicates that it would have
rejected any notion of due diligence had it been presented with the ques-
tion.42 In recognition of the "informational advantage" of securities de-
fendants, Sachs argues that Congress sought to protect investors and
place a premium on enforcement of violations.
4 3
Despite the emphasis on enforcement, Congress' employment of terms
such as "manipulative or deceptive device" in section 10(b) and the
SEC's interpretation in rule lOb-5 suggest that the statute was designed
to cover "fraud-like" activity.' Moreover, in developing a private cause
of action under rule lOb-5, courts have adopted many common-law fraud
concepts,45 including due diligence.46 Generally, there is no fraud when
one fails to disclose information to another who reasonably should be
37. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7Scc(a) (1982).
38. Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Act. Re]. 3411 (1951).
39. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966).
40. Id.
41. Sachs, supra note 13, at 126.
42. Id. at 129.
43. Id. at 128.
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
45. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 427 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter); Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256
(5th Cir. 1978) (reliance).
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 64:589
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aware Of' 7 or could easily discover that information by reasonably dili-
gent inquiry.48 Due diligence incorporates these concepts by imposing a
duty of care on rule lOb-5 plaintiffs much like that required of claimants
in a common-law fraud action.
In view of the statutory language of section 10(b) and subsequent judi-
cial and administrative interpretation, the due diligence requirement is
not as inconsistent with congressional intent as Sachs suggests. This is
especially true in the civil litigation context, in which it seems highly
unlikely that Congress would permit the potentially devastating rule 10b-
5 remedies without requiring any exercise of care on the part of plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, courts continue to bar rule 10b-5 claims when sophisti-
cated investors have access to all relevant information, whether or not it
is actually read, and reliance on any misrepresentations in view of this
access is unjustifiable.49 A contract provision indicating investors' access
to information and recognition of risks should be inserted in every agree-
ment of sale when the transaction involves the sale of a close corporation.
Such a provision inserted in the sales agreement preserves the existence
of crucial facts for use in potential securities litigation." It also alerts the
buyer to the importance of the occasion and the duty to investigate any
contradictions between oral representations and information contained in
the contract or investment questionnaire. Patent statements of nonreli-
ance should be avoided.5' Statements regarding access to information
and recognition of risks such as the statements used in the Zobrist case,
47. Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978).
48. Rodman v. Grant Found., 460 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 602 F.2d 64 (2d
Cir. 1979).
49. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
50. Most law firms already utilize investment questionnaires such as those involved in Zobrist.
The insertion of these crucial facts into the sales agreement, however, provides more protection for
the seller. It is an enforceable part of the contract. The parol evidence rule insures that evidence
contradicting contract provisions is not admissible at trial. This rule prohibits the plaintiff from
claiming lack of access to information and recognition of risks because the contract states otherwise.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW or CONTRACTS 97-116 (2d ed. 1977). An aggrieved pur-
chaser may argue that enforcement of the provision through the parol evidence rule constitutes
waiver. The provision, however, does not waive liability under the Securities Act. It merely alerts
the lawyer to his duty to investigate and thereby affects the due diligence inquiry.
The duty to read is also implicated. Generally, a party signing a contract may not subsequently
complain that he did not read its contents. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, at 329. This doctrine
provides additional protection because the provision is enforceable even if the investor claims failure
to read.
Sellers should use contract provisions as an additional method of protection, not as a replacement
for investment questionnaires.
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Number 2]
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however, should not be invalidated on antiwaiver grounds. 52
The following sample contract provision for inclusion in the Agree-
ment of Sale provides a method of avoiding the potentially devastating
consequences of the Landreth repudiation of the sale of business
doctrine:
Buyer represents that:
Buyer has had unrestricted access to all documentation and information
under seller's control and has diligently requested and received all docu-
mentation pertinent to the evaluation of the investment which is the subject
of this Agreement. Buyer has carefully read and scrutinized all information
furnished to him by Seller and understands the fair import thereof. Buyer
understands the nature of the investment and the risks involved. Buyer has
such knowledge, experience and sophistication in financial and business
matters to enable him to evaluate the merits and risks associated with the
prospective investment. 53
The provision draws upon the concept of due diligence recognized by
most of the circuit courts.54 This provision emphasizes the investor's ac-
cess to information regarding the investment and his business expertise
that enables him to evalute the investment. The presence of these two
factors makes a showing of due diligence on the part of the investor al-
most impossible. In view of the buyer's express recognition of his sophis-
tication, expertise, and access to information, any reliance on
misrepresentations without further inquiry would probably be deemed
unjustifiable.55  Even failure to read the provision will not protect the
investor.5 6
Sherry Rozell
52. See supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
53. The substance of the sample contract provision is primarily taken from the Investment
Questionnaire in Zobrist and prior rule 146(d)(1) regarding private placements. Private placements
required that the interests in the corporation may only be offered to a limited number of investors, all
of whom either possess sufficient business expertise to evaluate the investment or are able to bear the
economic risk of the investment. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 d-l (1981) (removed at 47 Fed. Reg. 11261
(1982)).
54. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 27-30 & 33 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 27, 30 & 35 and accompanying text.
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